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Big Sugar in southern Africa: rural development and the perverted 
potential of sugar/ethanol exports

  
 
Ben Richardson 
 
This article asks how investment in large-scale sugar cane production has 
contributed, and will contribute, to rural development in southern Africa. Taking a 
case study of the South African company Illovo in Zambia, the argument is made that 
the potential for greater tax revenue, domestic competition, access to resources and 
wealth distribution from sugar/ethanol production have all been perverted and with 
relatively little payoff in wage labour opportunities in return. If the benefits of agro-
exports cannot be so easily assumed, then the prospective ‘balance-sheet’ of biofuels 
needs to be re-examined. In this light, the article advocates smaller-scale agrarian 
initiatives.    
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Over the last decade around $3bn has been earmarked for investment in the sugar cane 
industries of some of southern Africa’s poorest countries. These investments have originated 
from foreign companies looking to produce sugar and ethanol for export, giving the two 
markets an increasingly high profile among the international business community. The Wall 
Street Journal noted that ‘outside Brazil, southern Africa is now the hottest spot in the sugar 
industry’ while the Chief Executive of one UK biofuel supplier has gone as far to say that 
‘southern Africa could be the Middle East of biofuels’ (Miller 2007, Owens 2007). These 
investments have also been relatively large-scale for the region. Due to the high capacity of 
the typical mill-distillery, the need to transport the cane immediately for crushing, and the 
preference of owners for tight supply management, millions of dollars have been poured into 
the construction of vertically integrated estates incorporating thousands of hectares of 
commercial farmland. Coupled with their political influence, these companies are thus 
grouped together as ‘Big Sugar’ – evoking the economic ambition and elite connections more 
commonly associated with the Florida sugar cane industry (Hollander 2008).   
 This article asks how investment in large-scale sugar cane production has contributed, 
and will contribute, to rural development in southern Africa. While many reasons for 
developing countries to pursue biofuel-led investment have been invoked – mitigating 
climate change and supporting fuel security among them – the claim made here is that, in the 
case of poor countries in Africa, it is the purported link to rural development which is of most 
relevance.
 
This is because African-grown biofuels would have such a small effect on total 
global carbon emissions as to make their contribution to temperature rises on the continent 
negligible, and, as we shall see later, it is also unlikely that they will begin to substitute for 
domestic oil demand any time soon.
1
 Despite the centrality of rural development to the 
biofuels debate, empirical academic analysis of the sugar cane industry in Africa and its 
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1
 The domestic market for ethanol in Africa is anticipated to be much lower in comparison to its export market. 
The International Energy Agency (2006) expects African demand for biofuels to be two billion litres by 2030, 
but this will be almost exclusively concentrated in Nigeria and South Africa, the major oil users at present. 
influence on the extension of economic opportunity and autonomy among agrarian 
communities has been thin on the ground. 
 To fill this gap, this article offers a contemporary analysis of Big Sugar based on the 
political economy of agrarian change, understood as the dynamic social relations of power, 
property and production that structure the distribution of wealth in rural areas. Emphasis in 
this article is placed on the change initiated by the interactions of multinational companies 
and the state in forging accumulation. This draws on a longer history of critical rural politics, 
which includes the work of McMichael (2009) on the successive world regimes created by 
the fusion of capitalism and geopolitics in which the purpose and possibilities of agricultural 
production are framed; the work of Kay (2009) on the synergies between agriculture and 
industry in driving national economic growth, especially germane in commodity chains such 
as sugar/ethanol which link farms closely to the processing factory; and the work of Bernstein 
(2003) on the fragmented classes of waged and non-waged labour and social differentiation 
accelerating under globalisation. Methodologically, it draws on interviews conducted with 
state officials, industry figures and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff in Zambia in 
December 2009, coupled with secondary data from national press and in-depth reports on the 
sugar/ethanol industry. 
 The article begins by outlining the basic economic rationale underpinning the recent wave 
of investment into southern African sugar cane (Section 1). It then details the specific ways 
these investments are believed to stimulate economic growth and rural development (Section 
2). Next the growth of the sugar cane industry in southern Africa is put in its world-historical 
context in order to highlight the long-held dependence of the region on foreign capital, be it 
donor or private sector. Through this the major actors and networks of Big Sugar are 
discussed, namely, the resurgent South African firms Illovo and Tongaat Hulett, and a host of 
European and Brazilian market entrants (Section 3). The main body of the article is dedicated 
to a study of the investment by Illovo in Zambia. In cross-referencing the potential economic 
benefits of agro-export investment against the Zambian experience, the case is made that, 
while the company has not flouted the law or any professional standards, by the same token 
neither have the intended benefits fully manifested themselves and nor have community costs 
been avoided (Section 4). The article concludes by noting that the discourse concerning rural 
development that accompanies such investments over-hypes the benefits, and, furthermore, 
ignores the extent to which they divert resources from other users and thus exacerbate 
economic dislocation and dependence. For this reason it is argued that large-scale investment 
should be de-prioritised in trade and industrial policy in favour of small-scale schemes that 
directly target the country’s poor (Section 5).  
 
Underpinning the dynamics of growth: export demand, market access and comparative 
advantage 
The increased demand for sugar cane ethanol can be traced to the biofuel blends mandated in 
OECD countries. In the case of the EU, as part of the Climate Change Package adopted in 
2008, each Member State is required to use renewable energy for 10% of its transport energy 
by 2020. Most of this energy will come from biofuels and since the EU is unlikely to produce 
enough domestically, it will have to import increasing amounts of biodiesel and ethanol to 
meet its target (cf. Franco et al. this issue). Since sugar cane is one of the lowest cost 
feedstocks for ethanol and also is capable of high greenhouse gas savings, it has been 
promoted as one of the best options for meeting this demand in the EU and other developed 
countries (OECD 2007, FAO 2009a).
2
 Meanwhile, the demand for sugar has been 
                                                          
2
 The lower GHG emissions of sugar cane are partly due to its biology since cane has a high sucrose content and 
needs less fossil fuel fertiliser than other biofuel feedstocks such as maize. It is also partly  due to the location 
and practices by which it is farmed, given that it is generally not planted on peat or recently deforested land, 
underpinned by consumption growth in developing country markets and declining production 
in the EU. Since 2005 world prices have been buoyant and the terms of trade for sugar have 
greatly improved. In fact, in August 2009 prices hit a 30-year high, and, for the first time 
since the world food crisis in the 1970s, global economic models have predicted the 
possibility of long-term inclines in the price of commodities like sugar (World Bank 2007).   
 The opportunity for southern Africa producers to meet this demand has been facilitated 
by a number of trade agreements offering improved market access. The most notable of these 
has been the EU’s Everything But Arms agreement, signed in 2001, which offered duty-free 
and quota-free access to its market for the world’s 48 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
Indeed, given that LDCs could export most products to the EU without restrictions anyway, 
this can be considered a piece of legislation explicitly designed to bolster imports of sugar 
(Richardson 2009). As Figure 1 illustrates, a significant number of these LDCs are located in 
southern Africa, giving the region an excellent opportunity to benefit from the higher prices 
offered for sugar and ethanol inside the EU’s protected market.3  
 
Figure 1. Status of the Southern African Development Community member states 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 The reason that southern African LDCs in particular have been touted for investment lies 
with their (perceived) comparative advantage in sugar cane production. With plenty of 
sunshine and access to irrigated fresh water this group of countries have the right climatic 
conditions to make them globally competitive producers.
4
 Higher cane yields have been 
recorded in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia than in Australia and Brazil, home to two of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
because the leftover cane leaves (bagasse) can be used to power the processing factory rather than coal, and 
because cane-burning in some countries, such as Brazil, is being phased-out in favour of mechanised harvesting.    
3
 It should be noted that not all countries in the region have gained from EU sugar reform. The non -LDC 
countries that previously had quota access to the EU market, including Mauritius and Swaziland, have lost a 
high-priced guaranteed market that they are not able to replace by exporting to other markets.   
4
 A 12-month sugar cane crop requires 36,000 litres of water per hectare, four times as much as an annual maize 
crop (Wetlands International 2008, 33). 
lowest-cost sugar cane industries in the world (FAOSTAT 2005). Alongside this, the five 
LDCs in southern Africa to have recently received foreign investment – Angola, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia – are estimated to have a total agricultural area of 194m 
hectares of which just 11% is under cultivation. This is similar to Brazil and ten times that of 
India, suggesting to some that there is enough land to produce cash crops for energy or export 
without disrupting domestic food security (Johnson and Matiska 2006, 43). Leaving aside the 
veracity of these claims, such is the bounty of biomass detected in Africa that one group of 
academics was moved to label the entire continent ‘an unexploited resource for biofuels 
development’ (Amigun et al. 2008, 694).  
 
Theorising the potential of agro-exports to deliver rural development 
In attracting foreign investment into their domestic sugar cane industries, the governments of 
southern Africa have sought to progress their export-oriented development strategies. In 
doing so they are well supported by contemporary theory that has advanced increased agro-
exports as a route to economic growth and poverty reduction in the region. For instance, the 
World Bank (2007, 233) has argued that African and OECD governments should to do more 
to promote the export of agricultural commodities, citing the liberalisation of cotton export 
markets in Zambia and coffee markets in Uganda as successful income improving policies. 
Similarly, Gibbon and Ponte (2005, 201–3) have suggested that to integrate into the world 
economy, African countries should pursue a strategy of ‘trading down’ by producing 
relatively undifferentiated commodities, which would allow them to achieve greater 
economies of scale, diversify customer bases and leapfrog intermediaries. Finally, in briefing 
papers specifically on sugar and biofuels, Oxfam has claimed that because of their limited 
domestic markets and comparative advantage in labour-intensive agricultural production, 
developing countries should take advantage of cash crop export markets where feasible. To 
enable poor countries to seize this opportunity, the organisation has thus made repeated calls 
for OECD countries to dismantle their agricultural production subsidies and tariff barriers 
(Oxfam 2004, 37; 2008, 37).       
 Literature on agriculture and development reveals three mechanisms by which such 
exports could facilitate rural development. First, it has been argued that the increased export 
of sugar and ethanol that results from foreign investment can lead to a virtuous circle of 
business growth. Macro-economic stability is enhanced as the balance of payments improves 
and export diversification reduces currency volatility (Dufey et al. 2007, Mathews 2008). The 
regulatory environment is made more conducive as governments become more adept at 
managing border controls, enforcing contracts and reducing red tape, constraints acutely felt 
in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2009b). And, last of all, government revenue in the form 
of corporation tax, income tax and tariffs levied on industry imports all increase, thereby 
allowing further state investment in public goods such as transport infrastructure or 
education.  
 Following on from this, by bringing with them managerial and technical expertise, 
foreign investors can help to increase labour productivity and lower the cost of agricultural 
products. This is another problem with particular relevance in sub-Saharan Africa, since 
agronomists frequently point out that much higher yields are possible in the continent. As a 
result many institutions have identified private foreign capital as the means by which crop 
research and improved farm efficiency can be delivered (FAO 2009b, UNEP 2009). The case 
for private investment and agricultural modernisation has been even more forcefully stated 
with the onset of climate change. Drawing on IPCC data, Collier et al. (2008) have estimated 
that over the next century southern Africa will become hotter by four degrees centigrade and 
drier as precipitation falls 10–20%. The authors suggest a number of adaptation and 
mitigation strategies to combat the worst affects of this, two of which – water storage through 
irrigation and low-carbon energy production – are practiced extensively in the sugar cane 
industry.  
 Taken together, these first two points suggest that agro-exports can make an indirect 
contribution to rural development by promoting national economic growth and resilience. In 
direct support of rural development, investment in the export of sugar and ethanol can 
increase on-farm and off-farm employment and revenue (Dufey et al. 2007, Cotula et al. 
2008, FAO 2009a). As higher-value markets are targeted and production expands, sugar cane 
mills either increase their own estate land, employing more people in the process, or persuade 
outgrowers to provide more cane by raising the price they pay for the crop. Where 
smallholders are engaged as outgrowers, the direct benefit is disbursed even further as a 
larger number of farmers are contracted into the supply chain. In turn, this extra money 
disbursed to labourers and farmers then finds its way into ancillary industry services such as 
cane haulage or warehousing, and, finally, into the local business community. By way of 
example Oxfam (2004, 4) have suggested that export-led investment just in the sugar 
industries of Mozambique and Zambia could create up to 30,000 permanent and seasonal jobs 
on the existing sugar estates. Meanwhile, researchers at the Overseas Development Institute 
have estimated that a smallholder producing sugar cane for biofuel production could earn 
roughly double the $5 per day maximum offered in traditional markets (Leturque and 
Wiggins 2009, 3).  
 The imperative to foster rural development remains acute. In the case of Zambia, for 
instance, the slow growth in GDP of 0.1% a year has left per capita income languishing at 
$1,358 and 68% of its 12.6m population living below the national poverty line (UNDP 
2009).
5
 As such many policy-makers have argued that sub-Saharan Africa needs to integrate 
into the world economy if it is to attain higher economic growth and allow its poor to ‘trade 
their way out of poverty’ (SADC 1996, Lamy 2008). To this end the opportunities afforded in 
sugar and ethanol market could be seen as a means to diversify the economy of these 
countries, transfer technology across the agricultural sector and bring increased prosperity to 
some of their poorest people. The purpose of the next two sections is to put this vision to the 
test.  
 
Historicising capital investment in the southern African sugar cane industry 
Before examining our contemporary case study in Zambia, it is necessary to first historicise 
the emergence of the sugar cane industry in southern Africa and reveal the continued 
importance of foreign personnel and finance, particularly from South Africa, in the growth of 
the industry. By highlighting the powerful cross-national and political role played by the 
private sector, this section sets up our study in two crucial respects. First, it moves away from 
methodological nationalism and its failure to examine the dependence of southern African 
states on foreign capital and the past problems of indigenous, import-substitution efforts. 
Second, it establishes a more nuanced understanding of state-capital power relations in a 
regional market dominated by a handful of companies that have been able to shape their 
policy environment, and, in so doing, confound some of the assumptions about their 
developmental impact.  
 The British colony of Mauritius was the first site of sugar production in southern Africa. 
A contemporary of the plantation islands of the Caribbean it began to produce sugar in the 
late eighteenth century, and it was the migration of its personnel into Natal that was pivotal in 
the establishment of the industry in modern day South Africa. By the late nineteenth century, 
and again in conjunction with established planters and colonial capital, sugar milling was 
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 The growth rate for GDP per capita, which is at Purchasing Power Parity, was calculated across 1990-2007; 
the national poverty line from 2000-2006.  
established in Portuguese East Africa (modern day Mozambique), and later, by 1930, in 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The next phase of sugar industry expansion began within 
South Africa, as the spread of irrigation into the Transvaal helped sugar production migrate 
inland from the rain-fed coastal plains, before taking in neighbouring and more distant British 
colonies. In 1951 Britain’s Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which guaranteed fixed prices 
to historic colonial producers, encouraged the South African sugar company Hulett and 
mining company Anglo-American, as well as the British sugar company Tate & Lyle, to 
invest in agreement signatories Southern Rhodesia and Swaziland. However, following South 
Africa’s withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and increased isolation, as well as a 
sustained period of low world prices in the 1960s, further investment was shunned. Attention 
turned to preserving market share in South Africa and regional expansion remained muted 
until the 1990s (Lincoln 2006, 118–20).  
 Sugar production in southern Africa during the latter half of the twentieth century was 
instead financed by borrowings by the newly independent governments, with plant 
construction and technical assistance largely provided by European sugar companies – Tate 
& Lyle and Booker McConnell in particular (Dinham 1983, 83). In line with ideological 
leanings at the time, in many countries the industry was nationalised and a government 
monopoly established to fix domestic prices at relatively low levels for the benefit of urban 
consumers. Yet in the face of declining profitability, ineffective management and wider 
political conflict – not least the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique – the poorer countries 
of southern African never developed a significant export base in sugar. Nor did ethanol 
production gain much of a foothold. Only Malawi developed an established industry base 
when it introduced a biofuel blend in 1982, though this was later hindered by a lack of 
molasses from the country’s sugar mills. As Figure 2 illustrates, despite their potential as low 
cost cane producers, by the end of the twentieth century the Least Developed Countries of 
southern Africa resembled not much more than a ‘frustrated success story’ (Tyler 2008).     
 
Figure 2. Hectares of sugar cane planted in southern Africa, 1961-2000 
 
 
                  Source: FAOSTAT.  
 
 It was the overturn of apartheid and the agenda of privatisation across the continent at 
large that combined to reinvigorate the expansion of South African capital in the regional 
sugar industry. Illovo Sugar emerged as a major force in the late 1990s when it was created 
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Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (LDCs)
Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Non-LDCs)
out of the ‘unbundling’ of the South African group Barlow’s and quickly acquired majority 
ownership shares of the privatised operations in Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland and Zambia. 
Alongside this investment in existing productive capacity, Illovo and two long-standing sugar 
firms – Tongaat Hulett of South Africa and Companhia de Sena6 – targeted the rundown, 
state-owned industries of Mozambique and Tanzania for rehabilitation. In these efforts, 
investors were assisted by the deregulation of prices, which meant sugar could be raised from 
its previously low level, and the liberalisation of import regimes, which made acquisition of 
machinery and spare parts easier.
7
 By 2008 these three companies accounted for two-thirds of 
sugar production on the southern African mainland, and, such was the scale of expansion that 
in the case of Illovo, its non-South African operations now contributed over 80% of its profits 
(Illovo 2009b).
8
     
 The latest chapter of foreign investment in southern Africa sugar has concerned the entry 
of Brazil. In line with what Peter Dauvergne and Kate Neville (2009) have called the ‘South-
South co-operation’ in biofuels, Brazil signed bilateral co-operation agreements with the 
Lusophone axis of Angola and Mozambique and opened an agricultural research station on 
the continent (Osava 2008).
9
 The country has also received delegations from southern 
African countries keen to learn from its own experience in producing biofuel.
10
 These 
networks have been designed to help replicate Brazil’s cane ethanol production model in the 
region by transferring Brazilian plant science, plantation management and flex-fuel vehicle 
design into the continent, a strategy which can be seen as part of Brazil’s wider attempt to 
move beyond the export of commodities and into the role of a provider of technology (cf. 
Wilkinson and Herrara, this issue). Illustrative of this approach is the $210m joint investment 
in Angola between Brazilian engineering firm Oderbrecht, state-owned oil company 
Sonangol and a private Angolan firm, with the former company undertaking the valuable 
estate construction. For their part, many African states have been keen to use their status as a 
duty-free exporters as leverage to attract such capital. Based on Mozambique’s recent trade 
agreement with China for instance, the Director of the country’s Investment Promotion 
Centre, Mahomed Rafik, issued a clear call for prospective sugar cane investors:  
 
A South African company in partnership with a Mozambican company, and with the 
raw material being processed by a Brazilian company, may gain access to the 
Chinese market, because the product will be regarded as Mozambican. (AllAfrica 
2009) 
 
This is not to say that companies in the Global North have been entirely absent from the 
growth of the sugar industry in the region. Most notably, in response to the reform of the EU 
market in 2005, British Sugar bought a controlling stake in Illovo, as detailed in Figure 3. 
 The idea was that British Sugar would harness the duty-free trading arrangements 
afforded to the LDCs by importing raw sugar from Illovo and processing it in its newly 
acquired refinery in Spain. By 2009 Illovo already accounted for 20–30% of all sugar imports 
                                                          
6
 Companhia de Sena, which ran Mozambique’s large Marromeu mill in the Zambezia Province town of Sena, 
was bought by a Mauritian consortium in the 1990s, with the national government retaining a minority stake.  
7
 The simultaneous threat posed by liberalisation of cheap import competition was mitigated when p rohibitive 
tariffs on sugar were re-installed. 
8
 In 2008, 4.5 million tonnes of sugar were produced in southern Africa (excluding Mauritius, which produced 
0.5m tonnes) of which 2.93 million tonnes were from the three stated companies (Illovo 2009a, Tereos  2008, 
Tongaat-Hulett 2008).   
9
 The research station is in Ghana and is an office of Brazil’s national agricultural research corporation, 
Embrapa. Embrapa has considerable experience in sugar cane production and actually helped decode the sugar 
cane genome.  
10
 Interview with T. Chisambo, Biofuels Association of Zambia. Lusaka, 3 December 2009. 
into the EU (European Commission 2009). Likewise in 2006 the French sugar producer 
Tereos acquired half of Companhia de Sena, keen to apply its experience of cane production 
with its Brazilian subsidiary to the company. The record of European companies in direct 
foreign investment, however, has been more mixed. While British-registered Principle 
Energy is still going ahead with its 18,000 hectare sugar plantation in Mozambique, its 
majority owner, Bryan Myerson, failed to encourage the board of D1 Oils, a jatropha 
producer of which he was Chairman, to exit the biodiesel industry and back cane ethanol 
instead (Lindsay 2010). Going further, both  Swedish firm SEKAB and British mining 
operation CAMEC have withdrawn their proposed investments in Tanzania and 
Mozambique, with financial concerns in the parent company and withering government 
relations apparently to blame.  
 
Figure 3. Ownership structure of Illovo (including share of stake) 
 
Source: Illovo 2009a. 
 
 As Table 1 indicates, as a result of investments over the last decade, the production of 
sugar in the region’s poorest countries has risen rapidly, with a greater proportion of this 
directed to export markets for refining. This is likely to continue as those projects that are still 
in the construction stage come on-stream in the next few years. This rapid increase in sugar 
output has been in stark contrast to the performance witnessed in more established producers, 
such as Mauritius and South Africa, which have seen their production and export growth in 
sugar either stall or decline.
11
 It also stands in contrast to the production of ethanol, which as 
the limited data in Table 2 reveals, has yet to develop in the region’s poorer countries as it 
has in the rich. For all its market potential, the ethanol industry in southern African LDCs 
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 The market factors attributable for this stagnation are higher labour costs and lower yields in the traditional 
sugar producing countries compared to the ‘new’ LDC producers, as well as a reduction in the guaranteed EU 
price for Mauritian sugar exports. 
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remains embryonic. In order to assess what impact this has had on rural development, and 
why sugar has succeeded where ethanol has so far failed, we now turn to our case study in 
Zambia.      
 
Table 1. Sugar production in southern Africa, 2000-2009 
 
 Sugar production  
(1,000 tonnes, raw) 
Sugar exports  
(1,000 tonnes, raw) 
2000 2008 
Percentage 
change 
2000 2008 
Percentage 
change 
Least 
Developed 
Countries 
Angola 0 0 + 0% 0 0 + 0% 
Malawi 219 318 + 45% 59 102 + 73% 
Mozambique 60 355 + 492% 56 305 + 445% 
Tanzania 167 303 + 81% 8 41 + 413% 
Zambia 235 350 + 49% 105 191 + 82% 
Non-Least 
Developed 
Countries 
Mauritius 684 503 - 26% 615 471 - 23% 
South Africa 2,645 2,307 - 13% 1,474 830 - 44% 
Swaziland 582 637 + 9% 599 623 + 4% 
Zimbabwe 609 294 - 52% 329 97 - 71% 
Source: F.O. Licht 2009a. 
 
Table 2. Ethanol production in southern Africa, 2000-2009 
 
 Ethanol production  
(million litres) 
Ethanol exports  
(million litres) 
2000 2008 
Percentage 
change 
2000 2008 
Percentage 
change 
Least 
Developed 
Countries 
Angola 0 0 + 0% 0 0 + 0% 
Malawi 12 18 + 50% 6 9 + 50% 
Mozambique .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Tanzania 0 .. .. 0 .. .. 
Zambia 0 0 + 0% 0 0 + 0% 
Non-Least 
Developed 
Countries 
Mauritius 6 25 + 316% .. .. .. 
South Africa 339 385 + 14% .. .. .. 
Swaziland 13 31 + 138% .. .. .. 
Zimbabwe .. 25 .. .. .. .. 
 
Notes: ‘..’ indicates missing data.  
Source: F. O. Licht 2009b, 72.  
 
Sugar cane exports and rural development: the case of Zambia 
As indicated before, the majority of sugar in Zambia, about 95%, is produced under the 
auspices of Illovo, which owns and manages Zambia Sugar (Kaizen Consulting International 
2006, 2). The company began life in 1960 as the Northern Rhodesia Sugar Refinery based in 
Ndola, processing raw sugar trucked up from its southern counterpart. In 1964 it changed its 
name to Zambia Sugar following the country’s independence and two years later the owners, 
Tate & Lyle, decided to build a new mill and plantation, collectively known as the 
Nakambala estate, in the country’s southern district of Mazabuka. Most of the land used for 
the development was ‘state land’, the fertile land formerly granted to white settlers and taken 
over by the Zambian government following independence, though many ‘squatters’ were still  
displaced and many more herders disrupted as they could no longer move their cattle across 
the district.
12
 A decade later another mass displacement occurred after the Kafue River was 
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 Interview by telephone with G. Nkombo, MP for Mazabuka District, Zambia. 9 February 2010. 
dammed, in part to maximise hydro-electric power but also to provide water for the sugar 
estate. The seasonal flooding of the Kafue Flats was interrupted and around 300,000 people, 
who relied on the floodplain for hunting, fishing and cropping, were deprived of their 
livelihoods and forced to migrate (WWF 2005).
13
 
 By 1973 Zambia Sugar was effectively nationalised under the guidance of the state-run 
Industrial Development Corporation. The vision of then President Kenneth Kaunda was for 
the sugar mill to be supplied exclusively by small farmers, using outgrower schemes as a way 
to channel resources and markets into rural areas. To this end, the Kaleya Smallholder 
scheme was established in the early 1980s. This was a joint initiative of the UK’s 
Commonwealth Development Corporation, the Development Bank of Zambia and Barclays 
Bank of Zambia, under which roughly 160 farmers were given seven hectare plots to grow 
sugar, and a small amount of additional land on which to build a house and grow crops for 
direct consumption. Together these smallholders produced 125,000 tonnes of cut cane, 10% 
of the total amount crushed by the mill, and received 40% of the price paid by the mill, with 
the rest accruing to the company that managed the plots (Nakaponda 2005, 49–58).14 But, 
ultimately, Kaleya failed to convince the government that a smallholder scheme could be 
rolled out en masse without jeopardising the reliable, low-cost delivery of cane. According to 
one interviewee this was because the ‘farmers’ chosen to run the plots were mainly retired 
government officials or villagers connected to the local chief, meaning that a lack of 
commercial farming experience and community solidarity resulted in burdensome 
management and frequent squabbles.
15
  
 Privatised in 1995 and sold to Illovo in 2001 the estate began its second phase of 
transformation when the new owners announced the Nakambala expansion project. At a cost 
of R1.6bn (approximately $220m) this entailed a doubling of cane crushing capacity in the 
mill and an expansion in the land under cane. The expansion took place through a 
combination of additional planting on existing company-owned land and a ZK 156bn ($30m) 
acquisition of the privately-owned ‘farm block’ Nanga Farms. Despite the preponderance of 
titled and marketised land into which Zambia Sugar grew, political conflict did still arise. 
One case involved the hundred residents of Kabanje village, who Zambia Sugar tried, but 
failed, to evict since it claimed it bought the title deeds to the land decades earlier (Mpundu 
2006). The MP for Mazabuka, Gary Nkombo, saw this as repetitive of early dispossessions: 
as he recalls, the local people had not been contacted when these deeds were first signed, and 
were now reluctant to leave because they had ancestral graves on the land and could not 
survive on the Kafue Flats since they lacked the requisite fishing skills.
16
 Another source of 
tension emerged with the company’s extension of its smallholder scheme to Magobbo 
village, comprising 73 would-be cane growers, and Monyonyo village, comprising 94 (Fynn 
2008). In the case of Magobbo, there was differing opinion as to how many people at first 
wanted to incorporate their land into the scheme. One female farmer said of the community’s 
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 Local communities were also affected by effluent discharge from the sugar estate and the illegal fishing and 
hunting of its migrant workers. The WWF has since been working to restore 50,000 hectares to the Kafue Flats 
by creating a conservation area, which has cost the organisation €1m over the course of a decade (see WWF 
2005). 
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 The company in question is the Kaleya Smallholders Company Limited (KASCOL), the business set up to 
negotiate with Zambia Sugar on the smallholders’ behalf. KASCOL provided training, irrigation, chemicals, 
cane cutting, haulage, re-planting, and administration services – leaving the smallholders just to water, weed and 
spray their plots, and then help in the harvest (Fynn 2008). 
15
 Interview, sugar industry employee, Mazabuka, 7 December 2009. 
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 As of early 2010 the conflict with Kabanje village had not been resolved. The solution favoured by Mr 
Nkombo, a swap of the village’s 50 hectares for 250 hectares of local state-owned land (only 60 hectares of 
which is arable), had been met with indifference by the central government (interview by telephone with  G. 
Nkombo, MP for Mazabuka District, Zambia. 9 February 2010).   
specially formed Magobbo Cane Growers Trust, ‘They forced us to go, saying if we don’t go, 
the graders will come and destroy our houses’ (Hatyoka 2010).17 
 All in all, some 27,500 hectares are now growing cane in Mazabuka, giving Zambia 
Sugar the ability to produce 0.45 million tonnes of sugar a year. This has transformed 
Nakambala into the single biggest agricultural entity in the country and the second biggest 
sugar operation on the African continent. We now refer to the three development mechanisms 
outlined earlier to assess how this productive transformation has manifested itself in practice.  
 
Wider economic growth through an improved investment climate 
To encourage companies to invest in a particular country, especially when production can 
occur in different places as is the case with sugar and ethanol, having an investment climate 
seen to be conducive to private sector enterprise is vital. In this vein, the ‘good economic 
governance’ expressed by the investment by Illovo has been vocally promoted by Zambia’s 
President, Rupiah Banda. Attending the opening of the Nakambala estate, Banda said:  
 
I wish to assure South African investors, as well as those of other countries, that their 
investment in Zambia is secure, safeguarded by the progressive politics and robust 
legal framework put in place by my government. I am therefore encouraging South 
African investors to take advantage of available opportunities in Zambia. (Chishimba 
and Mulenga 2009) 
 
 In examining the ‘progressive politics’ of this investment climate, however, it becomes 
clear that many of the intended policy consequences of attracting large capital flows into the 
country have been perverted. First, due to the excessive economic concessions awarded to 
foreign companies, benefits to the public purse from investment have been limited and future 
spending plans constrained. Prior to the Nakambala expansion taking place, Illovo signed an 
Investor Promotion and Protection Act (IPPA) with the Zambian government which allowed 
it to import machinery without paying duties and to access finance at reduced prices, and 
obligated the government to treat sugar as a ‘sensitive and priority product within 
government policy guidelines’ (Mataka 2008). Criticised for their opacity and effective bias 
toward foreign investors since only multi-million dollar projects qualify for assistance, these 
agreements have also tended to precipitate long-term financial asymmetry between host and 
investor, as the companies concerned manage to extend or deepen the provisions of the 
contract.
18
  
 In addition to securing an IPPA, Illovo has also been able to substantially reduce its 
national and local tax burden. In 2009 Zambia Sugar requested that it be re-classified as an 
agricultural rather than an industrial enterprise and have its level of corporation tax reduced 
appropriately. As detailed by a government official involved in the dispute, the company 
benefited from the fact that a court hearing was set within three weeks of the complaints 
being raised, giving the Zambian Revenue Authority little time to prepare its case.
19
  Drawing 
on its experienced financial and legal experts outside the country, Illovo won the decision and 
had its tax level almost halved as a result. Along with the tax relief awarded under the IPPA, 
Zambia Sugar accrued tax credits worth $26m across 2008-2009 (Zambia Sugar 2009). 
Finally, as a result of President Banda’s decision at the end of 2009 to extend the abolition of 
the crop levy to commercial as well as small scale farmers, Zambia Sugar is also anticipated 
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 According to Fynn, who conducted the feasibility study into the smallholder extension, nine of the one 
hundred households in the Magobbo community ultimately expressed a reluctance to take part in the 
smallholder project. Alternate land was meant to be found for these people (Fynn 2008, 30).  
18
 Interview with P. Chilenga, Consumer Unity And Trust Society programmes officer. Lusaka, 10 December 
2009. 
19
 Interview, Zambian Revenue Authority, Lusaka, 4 December 2009. 
to avoid the ZK 2bn ($400,000) annual cane levy it pays to Mazabuka Council (ZANIS 
2010). 
 Second, notwithstanding the rhetoric of the available investment opportunities, there has 
been a striking inability in the Zambian state to promote competitive markets and structural 
economic change, a problem again linked to the influence of monopolies. In the case of the 
sugar industry, Illovo has been active in preventing the emergence of large-scale domestic 
rivals. According to one source, when an established coffee farmer sought to move into sugar 
production Illovo used its leverage as a valued customer among Zambia’s dominant banks, 
ZANACO and Barclays, to persuade them to withhold finance for the expansion. Likewise, 
when the Indian company Shree Rakuna sought to establish a $200m sugar plantation in 
Mazabuka, Illovo encouraged the government to obstruct the deal, citing danger to its 
smallholder schemes should another low-cost producer enter the industry.
20
  
 All this is not to deny that the sugar industry has bolstered the macro-economic account 
in important ways. Zambia Sugar contributes an estimated 4% of the country’s GDP and in 
2007 earned $30m in foreign exchange, the highest export earner outside the mining sector.
21
 
But clearly the ‘virtuous circle’ that is meant to follow foreign investment has been 
significantly stunted. Indeed, it can be argued that the priority of Zambian politicians in 
promoting these investments has been to capitalise electorally rather than economically. In 
the case of the president’s attendance at the Nakambala opening, by emphasising his 
government’s role in the industry’s growth and by bringing South African President Jacob 
Zuma with him to commission the expansion, Rupiah Banda was able to ‘give a present to 
the people’ and raise his status as a ‘big man’ within the constituency.22 In another, 
remarkable, incident, an MP from Banda’s Movement for Mass Democracy (MMD) party 
was alleged to have marched into the Zambia Sugar office and threatened to ‘make life 
difficult’ for the company if it did not instruct its employees to vote MMD in the forthcoming 
elections. As reported at the time, the MP, Michael Kaingu, said, ‘When you have a problem 
you run to your friends and that is what we have done to come to you’ (Lusaka Times 2008). 
Since Mazabuka is held by the opposition UNDP party, the political significance of this state-
capital relationship is easy to see.  
 With respect to investment in biofuels, meanwhile, industry growth has suffered because 
it has yet to be fully underwritten by the Zambian state, as it has in virtually every other 
country where it has taken off. Despite announcements from Zambia Sugar as early as 2004 
that it had the capacity to produce ethanol, and the creation of the Biofuels Association of 
Zambia in 2006 to advise the government on industry and energy policy, by the beginning of 
2010 no blend mandates, no government concessions for start-up costs and no commitments 
on infrastructure had been agreed. The singular achievement of the Biofuels Association 
during this period has been the approval of standardised bio-diesel and ethanol fuels to be 
legally traded, yet without the attendant policy assurances, businesses have remained 
reluctant to produce biofuel for either the domestic or foreign market.
23
 For its part, Zambia 
Sugar was still in talks with the government as to whether it should turn its cane molasses, 
produced as a by-product in the manufacture of sugar, from animal feed into ethanol, and was 
seeking to enshrine supports in the country’s energy policy.24 
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 Interview, sugar industry employee, Mazabuka, 7 December 2009. 
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 Personal communication with H. Kumwenda, Zambia Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry Trade, 
received 16 December 2009. 
22
 Interview, sugar industry employee. Mazabuka, 7 December 2009. 
23
 Interview with T. Chisambo, Biofuels Association of Zambia. Lusaka, 3 December 2009 
24
 Zambia Sugar produces between 50,000 and 80,000 tonnes of molasses per year. Converting this into ethanol 
at a rate of one tonne to 300 litres would yield 15m to 24m litres of biofuel, or roughly 6% of the country’s 
petrol demand (Interview with T. Chisambo, Biofuels Association of Zambia. Lusaka, 3 December 2009). 
 Reviewing energy strategies in five southern African countries, Jumbe et al. (2009, 4985) 
found that this hesitant legislative process has been common across the region. While all 
countries had general policy statements on biofuels development only South Africa had any 
concrete strategies or institutional frameworks for delivering implementation. One of the 
reasons for this problem is the familiar tale of bureaucratic incapacity. An Oxfam (2009, 122) 
report noted that the tug of war between the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Energy 
over biofuels regulation, on the one hand, and the disinterest of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Co-operatives, on the other, had together sent conflicting information to the private 
sector. Another reason for legislative inaction can be found in the lobbying activities of the 
country’s oil industry. In playing the ‘energy security’ card to government the proponents of 
biofuels have run up against powerful opposition. Though it proposes only a two percent bio-
diesel blend and five percent ethanol blend, by claiming that Zambia could become self-
sufficient in liquid fuel by using just one million hectares of its 73m hectare land mass for 
feedstock cultivation, the nascent biofuel industry has indicated to the oil companies that their 
import-substitution strategy is a potentially significant challenge and thus worth rebuffing.  
 
Cheaper products through technological advance 
In theory, technologically advanced investors like Illovo should also be able to help boost 
domestic productivity and ultimately lower consumer prices. This has clearly not been the 
case in the Zambian sugar market. As illustrated in Figure 4, prices have risen steadily over 
the last two years, even doubling for one month and leading to queues outside sugar outlets 
(Mataka 2008).
25
 This widely consumed commodity comprises two percent of the cost of a 
‘basic needs basket’ meaning such inflation places a small but noticeable burden on 
Zambian’s poorer citizens (Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, various months).     
 
Figure 4. Price of a 1kg bag of sugar in Lusaka, 2007-2009 
 
 
Source: Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, various months.  
 
                                                          
25
 Accounting for inflation, which averaged 12% over the period in question, the average price roughly stayed 
the same, although it is worth noting, with respect to purchasing power, that wages typically lag behind 
inflation. 
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 While the government demanded action over the brief price spike – attributed by Zambia 
Sugar to a ‘breakdown in communications’ which led its distributors to export sugar instead 
of meeting domestic demand – it has been noticeably less willing to question the company’s 
underlying market power (Mataka 2008). A 2009 report submitted by the Committee on 
Economic Affairs and Labour offered a toothless investigation into systematic over-pricing, 
and the Executive Director of the Zambia Competition Commission, George Lipimile, has 
himself pointed out the difficulties of regulating multinational companies that took over the 
privatised firms in Zambia. Indeed, he cited Illovo explicitly as a case in which there had 
been ‘simply a shift of ownership from public monopolies to private monopolies’ (CUTS 
International 2004). As a result, prominent economists in the country have argued that while 
Zambia Sugar may alleviate temporary retail price rises by releasing stocks on to the market, 
its effective control over the market keeps the ex-factory price of sugar inflated (Mataka 
2008).  
 Such claims are given weight by the extensive use of import barriers around the national 
market. Given that Zambia is one of the world’s lowest cost producers, and since export 
subsidies are now prohibited under WTO law, one would expect Zambia to have a relatively 
open trade regime in sugar. Yet just as Illovo has sought to prevent domestic competition, so 
too has it used its industry dominance and political influence to shape the government’s 
agenda in excluding foreign competition Yet just as greater domestic competition has been 
repressed, so too have imports – an outcome which is difficult to divorce from Illovo’s 
preferences given the company’s dominance of the industry..26 For example, importsImports 
of sugar face a 25% tariff, can be confiscated if found to be unfortified with Vitamin A, and 
are subject to lengthy regulatory scrutiny by state ministries. In addition, prospective 
liberalisation of the commodity has been forestalled in both the Southern African 
Development Community and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) trade negotiations 
(KumwelaKumwenda, Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, 2009).
27
 In the case of the 
EPAs, since only a certain number of tariff lines could be given this special treatment, the 
success of the sugar industry in claiming protection came at the cost of support to other 
industries, which now face potentially increased competition from European exporters. In 
short, it was a zero-sum game where a concession for sugar meant costs borne elsewhere.  
 Another way in which agricultural productivity could be advanced through international 
investment is via the transfer of technology into related sectors. In this respect the doubling of 
irrigation capacity around the Nakambala estate, which is now the biggest user of fresh water 
in the country, could be seen as a significant boon for food production and water provision in 
the Mazabuka area. Certainly there have been some benefits. The water supply into the town 
has been made more stable by the improved irrigation infrastructure established by Zambia 
Sugar, and the company has also assisted in cleaning the area’s sewerage system, the cause of 
previous cholera outbreaks. Yet the town’s inhabitants still have to pay the market price for 
water – the only water subsidised by the company goes to the local golf course – and the use 
of water by smallholders for alternate crops is closely monitored, although most prefer to 
grow rain-fed maize in any case.
28
 Moreover, while Zambia Sugar itself is to become self-
sufficient in electricity generation by burning cane residues in the mill, by reducing the 
amount of water available to the downstream Kafue Gorge dam, the state electricity company 
ZESCO has been hindered in its ability to generate hydro-electric power for the national grid. 
In short, as the benefits of technological advances are effectively internalised and ring-fenced 
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 Interview with P. Mulemba, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection trade analyst. Lusaka, 8 December 2009.  
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 Interview by telephone with H. Kumwenda, Zambia Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, 16 
December 2009. 
28
 Interview, sugar industry service supplier, Lusaka, 11 December 2009. 
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by corporate investors, the claim of cheaper goods and services through productivity 
increases is rendered somewhat empty.   
 
Increased wealth through on-farm and off-farm employment 
Undoubtedly it is the number of people employed through Zambia Sugar that is seen as 
Illovo’s biggest contribution to the country’s economy. In total some 6,000 people are now 
employed directly by Zambia Sugar and another 1,500 work on the commercial and 
smallholder outgrower farms, altogether supporting some 50,000 family members (Zambia 
Sugar 2009). Even discounting other jobs created through the multiplier effect, this still 
constitutes around 10% of Zambia’s formal, waged sector.29 Neither the importance of this 
job creation nor the company’s support for social amenities should be underestimated.30 The 
company’s average wage of ZK 1.75m ($350) per month is far higher than the national 
minimum of ZK 300,000 (Zambia Sugar 2009). While the average wage clearly hides 
inequality between the different fractions of labour – for example, a male research supervisor 
is paid three times more than a female weeder – it cannot be denied that a job with the 
company remains highly prized (Oxfam 2004, 23).  
 What can be disputed, however, is Illovo’s role in supporting wealth distribution and the 
extent to which society bears the costs of increased accumulation. To begin, it is worth noting 
that the labour intensity of the sugar industry is relatively low. For example, while 7,500 are 
formally employed in the sugar industry, around 200,000 people are informally engaged as 
outgrowers in the similarly sized cotton industry (Tschirley and Kabwe 2009). The return of 
1,000 extra estate jobs and 1,000 temporary construction jobs for what amounts to a $250m 
total investment thus appears relatively slight (recall also Oxfam’s claim regarding the 
thousands of permanent jobs that would follow an increase in Zambian exports). Moreover, 
many of these estate jobs are seasonal, thereby reducing the gross disbursement of wages. 
Despite employing 6,000 workers at its peak, the average monthly employment by Zambia 
Sugar is in fact closer to 4,000 (Zambia Sugar 2009).  
 Since the majority of the workforce (88%) is male, this transitory workforce also leads to 
health and housing problems and strains on public services.
31
 Cane cutters transported from 
the Western Province constitute Zambia’s largest labour migrant group in the formal sector 
and through their use of prostitutes have contributed significantly to Mazabuka’s high HIV 
infection rate, estimated at 16–22%.32 While the company has taken some steps to prevent the 
spread of HIV/AIDS it has been helped in larger part by foreign aid donors who work in the 
area, the most recent example being a $4m USAID-backed project whose clients include 
some of the country’s biggest firms, including Zambia Sugar.33 Finally, there have also been 
a number of complaints about unforeseen tax deductions from seasonal bonuses and the 
withholding of pension payments. Whereas pensions could previously be claimed upon 
contract expiration, they are now released when employees reach the retirement age of 55 – 
not something many people expect in a country with an average life expectancy of 46 years 
(World Bank 2009a). 
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 In 2005, 4.9m people of the 12.6m population had jobs in Zambia, 17% of which were as waged employees 
(Zambian Central Statistics Office 2009).    
30
 According to Nakaponda (2005), Illovo has, aside from the direct housing and health assistance accorded to 
its employees, helped rehabilitate two hospital wards, provided support to the four government schools and one 
private school located on its estate, sponsored the local football club and traditional ceremony events, and made 
donations to orphanages and the local radio station.   
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 Interview by telephone with G. Nkombo, MP for Mazabuka District, Zambia. 9 February 2010. 
32
 Interview with M. Phiri, Plan International programmes co-ordinator. Mazabuka, 7 December 2009. 
33
 In 2009 61% of the permanent workforce and 48% of the seasonal workforce had undergone Voluntary 
Counselling and Testing for HIV/AIDs (Zambia Sugar 2009, 8). 
 Similar issues over employment extensity and public subsidy also devalue the 
smallholder system. Again, while the Kaleya outgrowers have been able to access essential 
amenities and earn on average ZK 1.9m per month, much more than the ZK 250,000 average 
from growing maize, relations with the KASCOL management and Zambia Sugar have been 
far from harmonious (Nakaponda 2005, 60). There have been long-running quarrels over the 
price received by smallholders for their cane, which they believe has been unduly lowered by 
the amount KASCOL has charged in service fees.
34
 Further, despite the expansion of the 
scheme, still only 10% of the cane delivered to Zambia Sugar will come from the 320 
smallholders; a similar rate to its sister company in Malawi. It is also notable that is has been 
aid donors, rather than Illovo themselves, that have funded these projects. The Magobbo 
smallholders received €2.7m out of the EU’s fund for countries affected by the EU sugar 
reform, while the irrigation required to serve the Manyonyo smallholders was funded by the 
African Development Bank.
35
  
 Finally, many of the valuable services contracted within the sugar industry have been 
awarded to foreign firms. The South African company Barlow World Logistics does most of 
the warehousing and distribution while another South African company, Rolling Thunder, 
does the cane haulage. Even within the firm itself, Zambians have claimed that they have 
been overlooked for employment in favour of South African expatriates. In some cases this 
has involved university graduates or current employees being told they are under-qualified 
since they lack industry-specific qualifications unobtainable in Zambia (Mataka 2005). The 
perceived failure of Zambians to benefit from overseas investors has been of particular 
concern given the country’s high profile Citizen Economic Empowerment initiative, launched 
by former President Levy Mwanawasa. The last in a long line of industries that have limited 
Introduced to widen the scope for indigenous economic growth, the initiative has been 
effectively redefined as one that facilitates increased ownership rather than increased 
employment. To this end, perhaps the most notable Zambian involvement in the Nakambala 
expansion is to be the sale of shares in Nanga Farms on the Lusaka Stock Exchange; a 
transfer of wealth between rather than beyond the country’s economic elite.  
  
Conclusion 
Facilitated by foreign investment and targeting the EU market, the rapid expansion of Zambia 
Sugar offers a number of lessons as to how the potential of sugar/ethanol exports to deliver 
rural development can be perverted. To begin, references to a ‘Middle East of biofuels’ 
emerging in Africa have clearly let rhetoric run ahead of reality. Based on the extrapolation 
of world trends or proposed investments, this rhetoric has overlooked the fact that crops have 
different end markets and that agro-industry seeks assurances when determining which will 
be targeted. Under these circumstances, the production of ethanol, either for domestic 
consumption or export, is subject to too many unknowns, whereas the (otherwise volatile) 
markets for sugar are already suffused with state interventions.
36
 In respect of sugar 
production, meanwhile, it was noted how the economic power wielded by Illovo enabled 
them to limit their tax contribution, prevent further investment, and lower consumer prices by 
hindering competition. Moreover, the dependence of the company on skilled expatriate staff 
and service suppliers stands in contrast to its casualisation of unskilled workers and limited 
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 Interview, sugar industry employee, Mazabuka, 7 December 2009. 
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 Likewise, the expansion and training of smallholders for Illovo’s two estates in Malawi has been supported by 
€2.4m from the EU pledge and $1.5m from the African Enterprise Challenge Fund. 
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 The export of ethanol is especially prone to being destabilised. Taking the EU as an example, an increase in 
second-generation biofuels in meeting renewable targets, the liberalisation of the EU market to Brazilian 
imports, and the future electrification of transport could each drastically reduce the demand for African ethanol.  
Comment [JM4]: should this be 
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uptake of smallholder outgrowers. Where these people have been employed, it has been as 
much to curry political favour as support the agrarian labour force.
37
  
 This situation is indicative of the bind that poor developing countries often face when 
attempting to attract foreign capital into their agricultural sector. Companies are reluctant to 
invest without certain guarantees, comparative advantage or not, and it is much easier to give 
them greater financial autonomy than construct a policy environment in which they can 
increase profits through market growth. Arguably a better use of bureaucratic resources, from 
a rural development perspective, would be to focus on regulating production standards, to 
improve the marketing of traditional products like beans, and to ensure the domestic 
provision of public food contracts where possible.
38
 This would ensure a more sure-footed 
adjustment since it would be based on existing livelihoods and social ties, and also prevent 
governments having to engage in asymmetric negotiations with powerful (and corrupting?) 
companies.   
 One riposte on behalf of large-scale agro-industry would be that, while it may not deliver 
on all its theoretical potential, it still provides relatively high wages for those fractions of 
labour engaged as employees or contracted outgrowers, as well as benefitting the wider estate 
community through its donations to public infrastructure. This would be more defensible in 
this instance if Illovo did not simultaneously divert resources from the public purse. The 
donations could be seen as a quid pro quo for over-loading sparse local amenities in the first 
place while the millions of dollars of aid it used to fund its smallholder scheme could have 
assisted indigenously-owned projects instead. Examples of these would be the programme 
run by USAID which provides business advice to small- and medium-sized firms in Zambia 
producing processed exports such as tomato paste and honey, or the Zambian non-
governmental organisation COMACO which buys commodities like groundnuts from remote 
farmers and sells them as peanut butter to retailers under its own brand label. The issue is not 
about trade orientation but rather about scale. Although the economic growth fostered by 
these smaller enterprises may be slower, they create less inequality within rural communities 
and allow a more labour-intensive entry into cash crop production. By contrast, seeking to 
incorporate peasants in agro-industrial commodity chains, while lucrative, is severely limited 
by their absorptive capacity (see Kay 2009).    
 Finally, it must be remembered that the recent expansion of Zambia Sugar relied on the 
prior dispossession of land and diversion of water in the area. In this sense, the case has 
peculiar spatio-temporal characteristics not generalisable to greenfield projects. Such 
ventures would have to acquire land, problematic in areas comprised mainly of customary 
ownership, and also access large amounts of water. Already, an estimated 60% of the water 
supply in the greater Zambezi river basin is used solely for sugar cane production in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Wetlands International 2008, 33). The quest for land and water 
in less accessible areas has already ignited confrontation in the region, and such is the 
footprint of the Big Sugar model of production that it is hard to see how it can tread carefully 
in this respect (Grain 2007).   
 To sum up, the limited benefits accruing beyond the confines of sugar companies at 
present suggest that the prospective ‘balance-sheet’ of biofuels needs to be re-examined. 
Certain assessments have implicitly assumed that as long as the major problems of biofuel 
investment such as rising food prices, deforestation and land grabbing can be mitigated, such 
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 At one point Illovo attempted to introduce mechanical harvesters on the estate but was strongly rebuffed by 
the government who feared the repercussions of a large reduction in seasonal cane cutting work ( Interview, 
sugar industry employee, Mazabuka, 7 December 2009). 
38
 One example of the missed opportunities of contracting in Zambia is the import by the World Food 
Programme of a maize-sugar-soya blend from Germany. All these products are grown domestically but fears 
over safety standards mean they are imported instead.  
ventures will be worthwhile. Yet is debatable how much there is for the country’s poorest 
residents to gain from an expansion of vertically-integrated production, especially in cases 
where ethanol would be produced from existing molasses anyway. If the aim of trade and 
industrial policy is to benefit the rural poor, just like if the aim of environmental policy is 
reduce carbon emissions, then it should target them explicitly rather than circuitously through 
the promotion of large-scale ethanol production. At best, the prescription for increased agro-
exports risks distracting governments from this goal; at worst, it could pave the way for 
further dispossession and displacement.   
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